FAR and FRR are closely related functions of the system decision threshold t. in a format such that the user's privacy is preserved even the stor-
portant factors for widespread deployment of biometrics based authentication systems. In this paper, we introduce a method for effecexist smed maj rems. 1 . changeatyBoetricstca notb tive combination of biometrics data with user specific secret key for beasiyecange taits thelimedpnumber of biometrics traits that human has. Ideally, just like password, human verification. The proposed approach is based on discretized the users should use different biometrics representation for differrandom orthonormal transformation of biometrics features. It provides attractive properties of zero error rate, and generates revocable in appliais.We the biometrics telain onerappia ' 1~~~~~~~S compromised, the biometrics signal itself iS not lost forever and a and non-invertible biometrics templates. In addition, we also present new biometrics template can be issued [2] . 2 token based systems where exact match can be obtained, biometrics systems are based on fuzzy match due to the noisy nature of 1. INTRODUCTION biometrics data. This fuzzyness deteriorates the performance of biometrics systems, and in general zero error rate can not be achieved Traditional methods of identity verification are based on knowledge by using biometrics alone. This characteristic of biometrics limits (e.g., passwords), or possession factors (e.g., ID cards) [1] . Such the widespread deployment in large scale and high security.
methods afford low level of security since passwords can be forExisting solutions for changeable and privacy preservable biogotten, acquired by covert observation, while ID cards can be lost, metrics are intentional transformation [3] or binding of biometrics stolen, and forged. Biometrics based authentication systems confirm with random cryptographic keys [2] . The major challenge in the foran individual's identity based on the physiological and/or behavioral mer lies in the difficulty of preserving the verification performance characteristics of the individual. Biometrics based method provides in the transformed domain, while the latter in the error tolerant cadirect link between the service and actual user. With biometrics, pability to retrieve the key from noisy biometrics data. A common there is nothing to lose or forget, and it is relatively difficult to cirproblem with existing works is the lack of strong verification accucumvent [2] . racy. In this paper, we propose an approach for strong combination A biometrics verification system is a one-to-one match that deof biometrics with user specific secret key to generate changeable termines whether the claim of an individual is true. A feature vector and privacy preservable biometrics, while producing zero error rate. xp is extracted from the biometrics signal of the authentication indiTo elaborate our approach, we also discuss another scheme where no vidual U, and compared with the stored template XI of the claimed discretization is applied on the transformed features. In this scheme, identity U through a similarity function S. The evaluation of a verithe template has the same level of security as that of the secret key, fication system can be performed in terms of hypothesis testing [3] :
but it provides good property that exactly the same performance can Ho: U = U, the claimed identity is correct, HI: U ? U, the be preserved as the original features in the stolen key scenario. claimed identity is not correct. The decision is made based on the In this paper, we demonstrate the analysis in a face verification system threshold t: Ho is decided if S(xp, xI) < t and HI is de- [5] proposed to store a set of user specific error correction parameters as mance of proposed methods, we compare Principal Component AnalKong et al [15] points out that the good performance of BioHashysis (PCA) and Kernel Direct Discriminant Analysis (KDDA) .PCA ing are based on impractical assumption that the secret key can not is an unsupervised learning technique which provides an optimal, be stolen. They also showed that the performance will be degraded in the least mean square error sense, representation of the input in if the key is stolen through experimental results. Lumini et al [16] a lower dimensional space. In the Eigenfaces method [17] [19] to address the nonlinearities in complex face patterns. Kernel based solution find a nonlinear' transform from the original image space RJ to a high-dimensional feature space f using a nonlinear function 0(-). In the transformed < t I > t high-dimensional feature space Xf, the convexity of the distribution is expected to be retained so that traditional linear methodologies such as PCA and LDA can be applied. The optimal nonlinear dis- Fig. 2 . Demonstration of computing probability of error in 2-D criminant feature representation of z can be obtained by: space
keys, therefore QP 7? QI. To quantify the probability of error and where e) is a matrix representing the found kernel discriminant subillustrate the importance of shifting the face features (step 2), we first space, and v('(z)) is the kernel vector of the input z. The detailed consider a case where ROT is applied on the extracted face features implementation algorithm of KDDA can be found in [19] .
directly, i.e., x = QTy. The FAR corresponds to the probability of deciding Ho when HI is true, P(HolHI), and the FRR corre- 
N N As shown in Equation 4 , the ROT exactly preserves the similarity of original face feature. This also accounts for the stolen key scenario, P(HolHI) P(Ixl < t)P(lxp < Ix, + tllxl < t)PI
where an imposter steals the secret key of the claimed identity, and ±P(lXI > t)P(k1 -t . IXP . lXI + t kXI > t)P2 use his own biometrics for verification. In this case, the verification performance will be the same as the original face features. From Equation 6, it is clear that the probability of false accept Let's consider a scenario where an imposter tries to authenticate depends on the characteristics and dimensionality of the features. In as the true user. Since different users are associated with distinct general, zero error rate can not be achieved by directly apply ROT on the extracted face features. However, since P(lxp < IX, +t I t1< strings. To quantify the probability of error, let's first consider the t)PI < 1, and P(I,, > t)P(l.1 -t < I.P < I, + t lh, > t) < [22] .
template, and produce zero error rate. However, it only offers limThe ORE database contains 400 face images from 40 subjects with ited security since the ROT is invertible. If the storage and the se-10 images each. The GT database contains 750 images of 50 people cret key are both compromised, the original face features of the user with 15 images each. The face images in GT database have larger will be revealed. To overcome this problem, we propose another pose and illumination variation than the ORL database. The original scheme which discretizes the random orthonormal transformation of images in GT database were taken on cluttered background. In this the original features. The discretization is non-invertible, therefore work, we use the cropped data set generated by manually determined this method provides more rigorous security, label filters. In both database, the first five images of each subject are
The procedure of producing the discretized ROT feature vectors used as training samples as well as gallery sets. The rest images of are as follows: each subject are used as probe samples. The classification is based on nearest neighbor. 1. Extract feature vector y C RN from the biometrics data Our evaluation is based on equal error rate (EER), which is de-2. Use a user specific key k to generate a pseudo-random matrix fined as the operating point at which false accept rate (FAR) and and apply the Gram-Schmidt method to transform it into an false reject rate (FRR) are equal, i.e., EER = (FAR + FRR)/2 orthogonal matrix Q of size N x N.
[12]. As illustrated in Section 3, the stolen biometrics scenario is the same as the both-non-stolen case. Therefore only analyzing bothnon-stolen and stolen key scenarios will be sufficient. A description 4 . Compute the N bits code b,i = 1, ..., N, according to:
ofthe abbreviations of the terminologies used in the paper is given in Table 2 . In general, The ROT-O and DROT-BH The first four steps in the above procedure correspond to the methods can not produce zero EER, while ROT-S and DROT-RB1 best performance scenario in the BioHashing method [12] . Unlike achieve zero EER in all dimensions. This complies with our analythe shifted ROT method, the discretized ROT method utilizes Hamsis in Section 3. In the stolen key scenario, The ROT based methming distance as the metric to measure the distance between two bit ods exactly preserve the performance of original face features, but 
